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Let us assume that both the United States’ annexation of Cuba and a military 
invasion of the island by Cuban exiles can be discarded. In fact, the annexation of Cuba has 
been out of the U. S. government’s agenda since the 1930s. In turn, a repetition of an 
operation like the Bay of Pigs in 1961 seems nowadays unconceivable. Still, in 1996 the 
Helms-Burton Act stated that “the Cuban government has posed and continues to pose a 
national security threat to the United States,” but in 1998 the U. S. Department of Defense 
concluded that, due to the weakening of the Cuban army and state following the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, “Cuba does not pose a significant military threat to the United States.” 
The present involvement of the U.S. administration in the Middle East seems to make other 
military interventions abroad unfeasible in the short term.  
There may be only two basic alternatives for the near future of Cuba, which can be 
labeled “continuation” and “transition.” The possibility that the dictatorship continues after 
Fidel Castro relies upon the Revolutionary Armed Forces’ strong control over not only the 
military apparatus, but also the police and security organization, and crucial sectors of the 
economy. This is certainly not the type of institutionalization that a stable dictatorship may 
require in the absence of the single person who concentrated powers to such a high extent 
as Fidel Castro did. In typical dictatorships not centered on a single man, a political party 
can channel diverse interests, ambitions, and internal fights within the power structure. For 
authoritarian rulers and would-be rulers in many Latin American countries, the historical 
PRI of Mexico, under the cover of a nationalist and populist ideology, was traditionally the 
model of that type of party. But even in the absence of such a complex political 
organization, a military dictatorship might survive in Cuba as a consequence of the 




difficulties to develop external pressures over the island and the relative weakness of 
internal opposition.  
For several decades, the rulers of Cuba have played a diminished form of conflict 
with the government of the United States, which could be prolonged in the near future. 
Immediately after 1959, the two governments developed a confrontation between 
“revolution,” implying a general expropriation of American and domestic properties and a 
significant threat to the U.S. security, and “counter-revolution,” including a foreign military 
intervention. But after the settlement of the missile crisis in 1962, the initial confrontation 
was replaced with one between “embargo” and “emigration,” between the U.S. trade, 
investment, and travel embargo against the island and Cuba’s periodical sending of 
emigration waves to the United States. By promoting massive “exit” of discontent subjects, 
the Cuban government was able to reduce their “voice” of protest. As is well known, the 
United States policy was extremely open to Cuban refugees, in contrast to usual 
requirements for would-be immigrants from other countries. But by opening the door to the 
“exit” of Cubans, the U.S. government neutralized some potential political consequences of 
the embargo policy, that is, the indirect promotion of internal protests due to economic 
difficulties and external isolation. (See my formal discussion in Colomer 2000a, 2004a). 
The result was that, in spite of external pressures and internal economic breakdown, 
the Cuban dictatorship was able to survive. In the near future, even after the disappearance 
of Fidel Castro, if the basic structure of the “game” between the Cuban and U.S. 
governments, against the background of internal opposition weakness is maintained, the 
dictatorship could still survive in the island. 
 




Conditions for a democratic transition 
The hypothetical alternative of “transition” seems, thus, to require some significant 
changes in the current relationships among the main actors involved in the Cuban “game.” 
A transition to democracy, as a way of regime change which can be distinguished from a 
democratic revolution and an external invasion, is based on a negotiation between 
authoritarian rulers and the democratic opposition. For a process of this kind to be feasible 
in Cuba, two major changes should take place.  
First, the internal opposition should be able to promote broader mobilizations and 
protests than in the recent past. Given the current level of organization and social influence 
of opposition groups, the most likely scenario for such a mass pressure might be a semi-
spontaneous explosion of anger and protests when a big signal for changes will be given, 
due to accumulation of malaise and the hard daily-life conditions of most Cubans. In 
parallel, the United States should use the embargo policy as a pressure for political changes 
in the island. Even more important, Cuban exiles should be able to induce the U.S. 
government to reform its current migration policy in order to put barriers to massive 
emigrations from Cuba. Preventing a new wave of drafters from arriving to the coasts of 
Florida may be both in the U.S. government’s self-interest and in favor of political change 
in Cuba. 
Second, the leadership of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces should confirm 
with facts its commitment “not to intervene against the people,” which was solemnly 
publicized during the rafters’ crisis in 1994. In other words, if the Cuban military leaders 
faced broad popular unrest, they should be inclined to choose the search of a settlement 
with the opposition rather than launching harsh repression against protesters. The latter 




condition was fulfilled in several cases of peaceful and negotiated transition in Southern 
and Eastern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, in contrast to the Tiananmen Square slaughter 
provoked by the Chinese rulers in 1989. The Cuban military leaders, to whom some 
fascination with the “Chinese model” has been attributed, should not share this crucial part 
of the story. (For broader discussion, see Colomer 2003, Latell 2003). 
It is, thus, under still dubious or non-existing strategic conditions that the project of 
a negotiated transition in Cuba may make sense. The term “transition” began to be widely 
applied to processes of change from dictatorship to democracy after the innovative 
experience of Spain in the second half of the 1970s. During its first few years, the Spanish 
transition implied an initiative role by a fraction of former authoritarian, reform-oriented 
rulers, rather than a victory of the democratic opposition. Further experiences of mostly 
peaceful processes of democratization introduced significant variants. In particular, the fall 
of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s included cases 
of more formal negotiations between authoritarian rulers and the opposition at a “Round 
Table,” as well as a number of sudden “breakdowns” of dictatorships at more eager 
opposition’s initiative. But the basic conditions for a transition by agreement can be 
generalized as implying, on one side, the impossibility for the authoritarian rulers to rule as 
usual (as a consequence of the dictator’s disappearance, some dramatic failure of the 
regime, or a surge in social unrest and pressures from the political opposition), and, on the 
other side, the impossibility for the opposition to attain a complete victory by its own in the 
absence of an armed uprising or external intervention. The comparison between the Cuban 
and the Spanish cases has been proposed before also due to the expectation that, in Cuba, as 
happened in Spain, the process of change should start precisely after the dictator’s death. 




Change implies uncertainty 
The hypothesis of a transition in Cuba is still received with skepticism by many of 
its potential actors. This is not surprising, as human beings tend to imagine the future on the 
basis of previously known experiences. The Spanish transition of the 1970s, in particular, 
developed in the midst of very high levels of incertitude regarding the future and its 
hazards, mostly as a consequence of the fact that several decades of dictatorship had made 
most Spaniards unable to remember or imagine what Spain would look like without 
dictatorship. Similar psychological reactions of fear to the unknown emerged in the Soviet 
Union in the late 1980s, despite strong evidence that the communist system could not go on 
as it was. Comparable problems to imagine a different future were visible even in a milder 
process of political change as the one in Mexico in the late 1990s: no living Mexican had 
ever known Mexico without the PRI and this eventuality was, thus, hard to conceive. 
Analogously, strong psychological resistance to imagine Cuba without Fidel Castro can be 
observed nowadays among many Cubans. But this is only a consequence of a very long 
period of dictatorship, misinformation and the erasing of memory, which can approach its 
end.  
In reaction to the actual happening of unanticipated events, actors participating in a 
transition process tend to stress indetermination and the power of human will. As was put, 
for example, by the reform leader of the transition in Spain: 
An important lesson which I for one have learned from the Spanish democratic 
transition… is that historical determinism does not exist… the future, far from being 
decided, is always the realm of liberty, open and uncertain, although foreseeable by 
the analyses of the structural conditions and the operating forces of the society in 




which we live, the most essential of which is the free will of those men who shape 
history. (Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, 1983, quoted in Colomer 1995, p. 1). 
 
In remarkably similar although unrelated words, the most prolific observing-
participant of the Polish transition stated: 
What we have learned during the past year 1989… is that there is no determinism in 
history, that our history depends far more on ourselves, on our will and our decision, 
than any of us thought. (Solidarity’s activist and journalist, Adam Michnik, 1990, 
quoted in Colomer 2000b, p. 1). 
 
In this spirit, some political and legal conditions for a democratic transition in Cuba, 
which could be created by “the free will and decision” of human actors, can be identified. 
They can be summarized the following way. First, a new government in control of the 
armed forces should introduce some preliminary constitutional reforms in order to unblock 
the system and open the gate of change by permitting the action of multiple parties and the 
exercise of civil liberties (to be specified below). According to the existing rules in Cuba, 
these initial constitutional reforms would require the approval by a two-thirds majority in 
the National Assembly of People’s Power and, for fundamental issues, a popular majority 
in referendum. Second, intensive legislation should regulate political rights more 
specifically, including freedom of speech, reform of the penal code, and the establishment 
of a new electoral law permitting multi-candidate competition for public offices. Third, 
under these new regulations, the government should call a competitive assembly election. 
Finally, the electoral results, which should be open and a priori uncertain, would tip the 




balance in favor or against further changes, including the elaboration of a fully new 
constitution. 
 This hypothetical process is obviously inspired in the Spanish transition. Note that it 
does not imply that authoritarian rulers develop a democratizing political reform on their 
own, but only that they introduce the necessary changes to call a sufficiently open election, 
whose result would determine the scope and orientation of further decisions. In order to 
start that process in Spain, the incumbent government did not ask the authoritarian 
assembly to approve a new constitutional model, but only a “law for political reform.” This 
can be an appealing strategy for incumbent authoritarians because they could maintain 
control during a first period of the transition and create reasonable expectations to preserve 
elements of continuity. In particular, in Spain former authoritarians achieved to secure that 
there would not be reprisals against them, in contrast to what had happened in France, 
Germany, Italy, and Japan at the end of the Second World War and, much more recently, in 
Portugal and Greece in the mid-1970s. By approving only a law “for” political reform, 
many important decisions regarding the constitutional, political, and economic model can 
be transferred to a further, and uncertain post-electoral process. (For more comparisons 
between Cuba and the transition in Spain, see Colomer 2004b). 
 
Actual constitutional reforms in Cuba 
A review of previous constitutional reforms in Cuba under the communist 
dictatorship may enlighten the scope and direction of possible future changes. There have 
been two reforms of the current Cuban constitution: one oriented to some opening of the 
system in 1992, and another with the explicit intention to reinforce the mechanisms of 




continuity in 2002. While the first reform can be taken as a precedent for liberalizing 
changes to be approved in the future, the second reform introduced a major obstacle which 
may require additional political and legal effort. 
 The current Cuban constitution was established in February 1976, in the aftermath 
of the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, during the period of maximum 
Soviet influence in the island. The entire constitutional text was embedded of Marxist-
Leninist ideology and the Soviet model of political institutions. 
 After the dissolution of the USSR and the subsequent fall of the Cuban economy, 
the National Assembly of Cuba approved by unanimity a constitutional reform covering 79 
of the 141 articles of the constitutional text. The constitutional reform which was approved 
by the National Assembly on August 10-12, 1992, included the following issues: 
• First, an ideological redefinition of the state and the party suppressed references to 
the Soviet Union and the community of socialist countries, proletarian 
internationalism, the people’s right to revolutionary violence, the driving role of the 
working class, socialist relationships of production, socialist legality, scientific 
materialism, education in the spirit of communism, and democratic centralism. New 
references were introduced to Latin America and the Caribbean, José Martí, the 
Cuban nation, and patriotic education. A few references to Marxism-Leninism were 
maintained. 
• Second, there was an explicit acceptance and security of freedom of religion and the 
separation of the church and the state (after having accepted some believers in the 
communist party); the family was acknowledged as “the fundamental cell of 
society” with “essential responsibility and functions” in education and formation of 




the new generations, while the possibility of non-state-controlled educational 
institutions was also introduced. 
• Third, public companies were given financial and commercial autonomy; the 
economic system was open to private enterprises and foreign investments, as well as 
to the possibility of privatizing farms and other state-owned enterprises. 
• Fourth, civil and political amendments included the autonomy of the Communist 
Youth from the party, the suppression of the constitutional status of the 
Confederation of Cuban Workers, the Committees for the Defense of the 
Revolution, the Federation of Cuban Women and other official organizations.  This 
way, opening the possibility for other organizations to be legalized in the future; the 
suppression of denial of citizenship to “those who in foreign territory act against the 
socialist and revolutionary institutions of Cuba,” thus permitting the future 
acceptance of exiles’ political participation; the introduction of non-competitive 
direct elections to the provincial and national assemblies, in contrast to previous 
indirect elections from municipal assemblies; and the creation of People’s Councils 
as territorial administrative entities. 
• Fifth, as a new reserve device to face the risks of this limited opening, the president 
of the Council of the State strengthened his powers over the armed forces. It was 
established that, in case of danger, he could declare a state of emergency. In this 
perspective, a new Council of National Defense, as well as provincial, municipal 
and zone councils of defense, which were mobilized for the first time in the summer 
of 2006, were created. 




Fourteen years ago, this constitutional reform generated expectations of significant 
changes in the political system. A group of reform rulers, supported mainly by the Ministry 
of the Interior, drafted a plan that included the call of multi-candidate elections for 
parliament or for prime minister (depending on different versions), while establishing that 
Fidel Castro could maintain the presidency of the Republic or the command of the armed 
forces. But the initiative was thwarted by Castro himself by expelling the reformers from 
the Communist Party and reinforcing the control of the military over the Ministry of the 
Interior and other sectors of public activity. 
The second constitutional reform in Cuba was introduced ten years later, in a 
moment of growing expectations fostered by visible signals of Castro’s physical decay, 
increasing foreign pressures, and internal opposition’s political initiatives for 
democratization. However, this reform was reactionary –in the literal sense of a reaction 
against demands for change. After a campaign to collect citizens’ signatures, the National 
Assembly approved by unanimity, on June 24-26, 2002, a constitutional reform including 
two points: 
• It was established that “socialism and the revolutionary political and social system 
[…] are irrevocable and Cuba will never go back to capitalism” (art. 3). 
• It was excluded from the procedure of constitutional reform above mentioned, 
everything which is “related to the political and social system,” given its new 
“irrevocable” condition, as well as “negotiations of agreements under aggression, 
threat, or coercion by a foreign power” (art. 137), by this way trying to prevent any 
future exchange of economic aid for political democratization as had been proposed 
by both the United States and the European Union from the mid-1990s. 




Future necessary reforms 
From the starting point of the current constitution of the Republic of Cuba, a 
preliminary reform appears to be indispensable in order to make other democratizing 
reforms feasible: the abrogation of the 2002 reform. In some sense, the provision stating 
that Cuba will never go back to capitalism is innocuous; it is written as if Fidel Castro will 
never die. But that provision certainly creates a new obstacle to future reforms and, above 
all, it induces and anticipates a strategy of frontal resistance to changes by a hard-line core 
of rulers.  
However, the existing legal text does not prevent its own reform and revocation. 
Legal arguments to introduce new major constitutional reforms in Cuba could be as 
following. First, there is a superior constituent principle, which is established in Article 3 of 
the constitution of Cuba, by which: “In the Republic of Cuba the sovereignty lies in the 
people, from whom all power of the state springs off.” This principle was explicitly 
confirmed in the law of constitutional reform of 2002, whose preamble holds that “the 
people of Cuba [are] the holders of the sovereign power of the state and henceforth of the 
constituent power of the nation.” The Cuban people’s sovereignty and their superior 
constituent power are exercised through the procedure before mentioned, which includes 
initiative before the National Assembly, approval by supermajority of the latter and, on 
fundamental issues, ratification by majority in popular referendum. 
 Second, in exercise of the people’s sovereign and constituent power, and following 
the established procedure of constitutional reform, it is possible to reform all elements of 
the constitution, including those points in articles 3 and 137 in which the “irrevocable” 
character of the existing political and social system is established. In other words, it is 




possible to proceed legally to a constitutional reform with the same scope and the same 
procedures of the one introduced in 2002, but in the opposite direction. What was changed 
in 2002 by the people’s sovereign and constituent power, according to the established legal 
procedure, can be changed again to re-establish the previous text of the constitution. 
 If this preliminary reform were approved, it would be possible to proceed to at least 
two additional constitutional reforms which seem to be indispensable in order to call a 
competitive election with participation of the opposition. They affect article 5 of the 
constitution, which establishes that the Communist party of Cuba is “the higher driving 
force of the society and the state,” in a similar way to analogous articles that were 
eliminated from constitutions of East European countries at the beginning of their reform 
processes in the late 1980s. Second, at least two articles which impose strong restrictions on 
civil and political liberties should be removed in order to permit an acceptable level of 
political pluralism. They are article 58, which excludes private property of press, radio, 
television, and cinema, and article 62, which restricts liberties to those who will exert them 
according to the aims of the socialist state, socialism and communism. Of course, for an 
election to be fair, some basic requisites are freedom of press, as well as the opposition’s 
access to public radio and television. (With comparable purposes, Domínguez 2003 
discusses a much broader reform of the current Cuban constitution, including institutional 
aspects which are not strictly necessary to call a first competitive election, but can be 
deferred to post-electoral decisions). 
 The minimal reform here sketched to make a competitive election feasible is much 
less extensive than the constitutional reform that was approved by the National Assembly 
of Cuba in 1992 and, therefore, it should not be considered to be unattainable. As the 




dissolution of the USSR motivated a broad constitutional reform, the unique event of Fidel 
Castro’s disappearance could justify an initiative with at least similar scope. Likewise, the 
initial approval of the constitution by referendum in 1976 could help any future 
modification appear as legitimate to the regime’s supporters as the constitution was from 
the beginning, and even more than the 1992 and 2002 reforms, which were not ratified by 
popular referendum.  
Further stages of the transition process –involving major decisions on the general 
structure of the political system and on controversial issues such as property rights and the 
fate of state-owned enterprises-- would depend on the electoral results and the different 
actors’ relative strength and capability of initiative. If the Cuban dictatorship were 
sufficiently pressured from inside and outside the island, a reform fraction of rulers could 
be motivated to undertake such process. But they would likely do it only if the outcome 
were uncertain and there were the possibility for former authoritarians to compete with 
some success in the electoral arena. In this framework, it would also be possible that a 
mostly peaceful and initially legal process of liberalization would lead to an acceptable 
degree of democratization of Cuba; as such a kind of change took place –to the great 
surprise of witnesses and actors-- in other totalitarian, communist, or military dictatorships.  
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